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Abstract
We model the educational choice of students whose objectives in terms of salary are conditioned by their social
origins. We assume that students from a poor background have a lower reference point than students with wealthier
origins. We then study the efficiency of a policy of tuition fees as a mechanism to select students on the basis of their
academic abilities. We show that, even in the absence of borrowing constraints, the optimal policy consists in lowering
tuition fees for poorer students: since prospective students from a disadvantaged background perceives the possibility
of joining the university as a gain, they have a tendency to act too cautiously compared to students with higher
aspirations, who are ready to take risky choices in order to avoid what they perceive as a failure, i.e. not joining the
university.
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1 Introduction
Higher education is characterised by numerous issues of information asymmetries,
aﬀecting both students and universities (Friedman 1962): the agents are for in-
stance unable to perfectly observe ex ante the “quality” of the other agent (e.g.
the academic abilities of the student, the standard of the courses provided by the
university... see Jongbloed 2003, Teixeira 2006). This issue of adverse selection
justiﬁes (from the point of view of the universities) the implementation of a se-
lection mechanism at the entry of higher education, such that only suﬃciently
talented students are recruited (Betts 1998, Fernandez and Gali 1999). Two kinds
of mechanism are then possible (and sometimes used in combination) to elicit the
quality of prospective students: exams and tuition fees (Del Rey and Romero 2004,
Fernandez 1998). Tuition fees select the students on their willingness to pay their
studies, and therefore on their “real” motivation in joining the university. They
should therefore reveal the preferences of the individual, whereas exams — if they
are eﬃcient — directly reveal the quality of prospective students.
The implementation of tuition fees has been defended by Gary-Bobo and Tran-
noy (2005, 2008), who show that this policy is eﬃcient even in relatively complex
environments, for instance when the students have a noisy perception of their own
quality (and therefore do not precisely know their probability of graduating). Fur-
thermore, in presence of borrowing constraints, they show that tuition fees are
eﬃcient when implemented in combination with exams. Fernandez (1998) also
show that, when universities are in competition, the tuition fees they implement
reveal their quality: good students therefore join good universities characterised
by a high level of tuition fees. However, in presence of borrowing constraints and
competition between universities, exams may be preferable if they are suﬃciently
eﬃcient.
Those approaches are however grounded on a a-psychological and a-sociological
conception of students’ behaviours (Flacher and Harari-Kermadec 2013, Flacher
et al. 2013, Moulin 2014), assuming that prospective students are rational decision
makers. In this paper, we suggest that the crucial hypothesis underlying the eﬃ-
ciency of tuition fees is the rationality of prospective students. The fundamental
mechanism of tuition fees indeed consists in giving a monetary incentive to which
rational individuals will perfectly respond. Boundedly rational individuals may
however misperceive the incentives, and therefore take inadequate decisions. The
aim of this paper is to highlight that a proper analysis of tuition fees shall con-
sider the decision biases aﬀecting the educational choices of the individuals. We
therefore provide a very simple model without issues of information or borrowing
constraints so as to isolate the impact of bounded rationality on the eﬃciency of
a policy of tuition fees. We argue that prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
1979) oﬀers a relevant framework to model the decision of individuals diﬀerentiated
by their social origins and show that, even in the absence of borrowing constraints,
the optimal policy consists in increasing tuition fees with the income of the parents.
We therefore stress that assuming that individuals are rational decision makers is
a too strong assumption for modelling educational choices: the risk is indeed that
students from a disadvantaged background will be relatively more disincentivised
than students from a wealthier background, and therefore that good but poor
students will be excluded from higher education, and be replaced by weaker but
wealthier students.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our model of educational
choice. Section 3 then discusses the objective of the planner and states our main
proposition. We conclude by discussing some policy implications in section 4.
2 Educational choice and loss aversion
Conventional welfare economics assume that individuals choose as if seeking to
satisfy coherent (i.e. stable, consistent and context-independent) preferences. In
the case of educational choice, those preferences represent the individuals’ evalu-
ations of the possible educational outcomes, which are generally reduced to the
expected salary of the individuals. It is however probably dubious to treat edu-
cational choices as standard choices between lotteries, since those kind of choices
signiﬁcantly impact the whole life of the individual. In particular, educational
outcomes are considered with respect to the social aspiration of the individual,
i.e. the standard of living the individual intends to sustain during the rest of
her life. It is then likely that two individuals of the same quality (i.e. who have
the same academic abilities, and therefore the same chance of graduating from
a given university) may take diﬀerent decisions if their levels of aspiration diﬀer.
Consider for instance the educational choice of Marine and Tony. Marine comes
from a relatively rich family and is used to live quite comfortably. If she does not
go to university, she will not be able to keep her level of consumption and will
probably diﬃcultly accept her more modest life. On the contrary, Tony grew up
in a relatively poor family and is used to a modest standard of living. While he
would greatly appreciate going to university so as to be able to get a high salary,
he would not consider as a failure the option of quitting his studies before univer-
sity. Suppose that Marine and Tony have the exact same chance of graduating if
they go to the university: due to their diﬀerent social aspirations, it is likely that
Marine will be more tempted to pursue her studies than Tony, since her desire to
avoid downward social mobility is stronger than Tony’s desire for upward social
mobility.
Several sociological works suggest that the diﬀerences in social aspirations be-
tween social classes can explain at least partially the diﬀerent educational choices
between individuals (Hyman 1953, Kahl 1957, Keller and Zavalloni 1964, Boudon
1974, Bourdieu 1974). Bourdieu for instance argued that “the adolescent will be-
have such that he will achieve what he perceives as an established fact: when you
belong to a disadvantaged background, you cannot join University” (p.6). It indeed
appears that the lower the student social class is, the lower her social aspiration
will be (Krauss 1964, Page 2005). This diﬀerence of aspiration may then lead to
diﬀerence in educational choices, since it is likely to aﬀect the attitude towards
risk of the individual. This kind of perception biases has for instance been theo-
rised by the concept of relative risk aversion (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997, Holm
and Jaeger 2008), according to which the risk aversion of an individual directly
depends on her social position and the potential social mobility induced by her
choices. Relative risk aversion theory is consistent with the sociological work of
Boudon (1974, 1994) who showed that inequality between students pathways can
be explained by the diﬀerences between the strategies of diﬀerent social classes:
the existence of distinct social positions leads to the existence of diﬀerent systems
of expectations and decisions (Boudon 1974, page 211).
An important bias that is likely to aﬀect the decision of the students is therefore
their social origins, through the subjective perception they will have of educational
success. While poor individuals will perceive the event “going to university” as an
improvement of their situation compared to “not going to university” — which
constitute for them the benchmark case — students will wealthier origins (with
highly-educated parents for instance) will perceive the event “going to university”
as the benchmark case, and “not going to university” as an educational failure.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s prospect theory seems here to oﬀer a relevant
framework to model the educational choice of students whose choice are condi-
tioned by their social origins: the core of prospect theory is indeed that individual
choice may depend on the subjective representation of the diﬀerent lotteries in
terms of gains or losses. We will therefore develop a model of educational choice
in which prospective students are loss averse, i.e. they are risk averse when con-
sidering prospects involving gains, but risk-seeking when facing losses.
Since our aim is to highlight the central role of the assumption of perfect
rationality for the eﬃciency of a policy of tuition fees, we will provide here a
very simple framework, so as to isolate the impact of the introduction of cognitive
biases from other factors such as information issues or borrowing constraints. We
consider a ﬁnite population of prospective students N = {1; . . . ;n} indexed by
i, characterized by (1) a payoﬀ function ui, (2) a reference point x¯i and (3) an
exogenous quality pi ∈ [0; 1]. The quality of i is measured such that an individual i
with quality p has a probability p of graduating (p for instance gives a measure of i’s
academic abilities). We do not endogenise the level of eﬀort of the student once she
joined the university to keep the model as simple as possible1. For sake of clarity,
we assume that the payoﬀ function of each student i is linear and corresponds to
her salary, i.e. ∀i ∈ N , ui(x) = x. The educational choice of an individual i can
be formulated as follows:
• either stop one’s study, and get a low-qualiﬁed work, with a low salary GL;
• or continue one’s study, knowing that (i) i must pay a tuition fee Fi ∈
[0 ;GH −GL], (ii) she has a probability pi ∈ [0 ; 1] of graduating, such that:
– if i graduates, she will get a high-qualiﬁed work, whose discounted salary
GH is strictly higher than GL;
– if i fails, she will get a low-qualiﬁed work and a low salary GL; since
she only gets her ﬁrst salary after several years of unpaid studies, she
perceives this gain as weighted by a discount parameter δ < 1.
This educational choice can therefore be represented as a choice between two
prospects H (study) and L (work)2:
?
H = (GH − Fi, pi; δGL − Fi, 1− pi)
L = (GL, 1)
(1)
We consider that each player has a reference point, i.e. a level of outcome x¯i
such that:
• if i gets an outcome x > x¯i, then she will perceive x as a gain;
• if i gets an outcome x < x¯i, then she will perceive x as a loss.
According to the experimental results of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the
individuals have a tendency to be more risk averse when they are facing prospects
with gains, and more risk-seeking when facing losses. This reference point can be
interpreted as the social aspiration of the individual in terms of outcome: we can
therefore assume that this reference point directly depends on the social origins of
the prospective students, and that an individual from a disadvantaged background
will have a relatively lower reference point than a more favoured individual.
1Endogenising p would not actually change our result. The students would be characterised
by exogenous academic abilities and/or a cost of eﬀort, and pi would be interpreted as the
probability of graduating of i, knowing her optimal eﬀort in the second stage.
2We reproduce here the notation of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The prospect P =
(x1, p1; . . . ;xK , pK) means that the player get the outcome xk with a probability pk, ∀k ∈ [[1 ;K]].
P denote the set of prospects.
This implies that i is not an expected utility maximiser, but maximises instead
the following function Vi : P ?→ R:
Vi(P ) =
?
k∈K
pkv(xk − x¯i), (2)
with P a prospect, and v a value function that integrates the perception of the
outcome as a gain or a loss. Kahneman and Tversky (1992) suggested that this
value function is (i) concave for gains, (ii) convex for losses, and (iii) steeper for
losses than for gains. We have therefore:
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∂v
∂x(x) > 0 ∀ x ?= 0
∂2v
∂x2 (x) ≤ 0 if x > 0
∂2v
∂x2 (x) ≥ 0 if x < 0
∂v
∂x(−x) ≥
∂v
∂x(x) if x > 0
(3)
In this framework, the prospective students have the choice between a risky
prospect (continue their studies) and a riskless one (get a low qualiﬁed work).
An individual i will choose to continue her studies if and only if she prefers the
prospect H to the prospect L, i.e. if and only if:
Vi(H) ≥ Vi(L)
⇔ pi ≥ p¯i
with p¯i =
v [GL − x¯i]− v [δGL − Fi − x¯i]
v [GH − Fi − x¯i]− v [δGL − Fi − x¯i]
.
(4)
p¯i can be interpreted as a threshold of self-selection: prospective students whose
quality is less than p¯i will choose the riskless prospect, whereas the suﬃciently
talented students will prefer to pursue their studies.
3 Optimal policy
We now take the standpoint of the university so as to determine the optimal level
of tuition fees. Suppose for convenience that the university is public, and therefore
that its tuition fees policy is determined by the social planner. Suppose that the
university supports a ﬁxed cost c > 0 per student, such that GH − c ≥ GL. There
is therefore a net gain for the society if an individual gets a high-qualiﬁed work.
In the absence of tuition fees, it is possible that students of a relatively low
quality go to university, although their expected gain is lower than the cost sup-
ported by the university. The impossibility to observe the quality of the students is
therefore likely to lead to a suboptimal situation in terms of social welfare: imple-
menting tuition fees may therefore give a monetary incentive to those individuals
to stop their study. A diﬃculty may however arise in our situation, since there
is a diﬀerence between ui, the function that determines the payoﬀ of the individ-
ual, and Vi, the function that represents the actual preferences of the individual,
whose satisfaction determines the choice of the individual. The deﬁnition of the
social welfare function is therefore not unambiguous since ui and Vi seem to be
both reasonable candidates for measuring the welfare of the individuals. It should
however be noticed that the reference point integrated into the function Vi does
not correspond to any measure of welfare (unlike the function ui): it is merely a
mathematical construction allowing us to model a cognitive bias. It is therefore
probably more relevant to consider only ui when deﬁning the social welfare func-
tion3. We therefore deﬁne the social welfare as the sum of payoﬀ of the individuals
minus the net cost of studies supported by the university.
The social planner deﬁnes the level of tuition fees Fi such that only the suf-
ﬁciently talented students choose the risky prospect, knowing that the decision
of the students is determined by the relation (4). The social welfare function is
therefore:
SW (Fi, ∀i ∈ N) =
?
i∈N,pi≥p¯i
[piGH + (1− pi)δGL − Fi]+
?
i∈N,pi<p¯i
GL+
?
i∈N,pi≥p¯
(Fi − c)
(5)
Since the self-selection threshold p¯i of the individual i does not depend on the
cost of studies c supported by the university, the planner can try to implement a
threshold p¯∗ such that only the suﬃciently talented students (whose probability of
success pi is higher than p¯∗) go to university. Since the objective of the planner is to
3This assumption is actually in line with most of the literature on behavioural welfare eco-
nomics, such as libertarian paternalism and nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 2008): what matters
from the social planner’s perspective is the “true preferences” of the individual, i.e. the prefer-
ences on which she would have acted were she not misled by cognitive biases. The argument
underlying this approach is that the individuals would change their decisions were they aware
that their actual decision was inﬂuenced by some cognitive biases. If Marine becomes aware that
the main reason motivating her choice is the fear of downward social mobility, and that she is
likely to end up with an even worse situation (getting a low qualiﬁed work after unsuccessful
studies), then she may reconsider her choice and accept to stop her studies. Since Marine’s actual
preferences could be “corrected” by a thorough introspection on the reasons of her choice, it seem
more legitimate to consider Marine’s true preferences in a welfarist perspective rather than her
biased preferences.
send to the university only the best students, it implies that a necessary condition
of this policy is that two individuals with the same probability pi must take in
ﬁne the same decision. The objective of the planner can therefore be rewritten as
follows:
max
p¯∈[0;1]
SW (p¯) =
?
i∈N,pi≥p¯
[piGH + (1− pi)δGL − c] +
?
i∈N,pi<p¯
GL. (6)
The planner can then compute the optimal level of fees F ∗i such that p¯i(F ∗i ) =
p¯∗, ∀i ∈ N , i.e. such that the self-selection threshold of each individual i corre-
sponds to the optimal threshold. We can determine the optimal threshold p¯∗ that
maximises the social welfare:
p¯∗ = GL(1− δ) + cGH − δGL
. (7)
We can ﬁrstly notice that, if the students are not loss averse, then the function v
is linear. The optimal level of tuition fees is F ∗i = c ∀i ∈ N , i.e. the students must
directly support the cost of their studies. In the presence of loss averse students,
we can however show the following result (the proof is provided in appendix):
Proposition 1. Let F ∗i denote the level of tuition fees such that p¯i(F ∗i ) = p¯∗,
∀i ∈ N . F ∗i increases with the reference point x¯i if:
• x¯i ∈ [x−i ; x+i ];
• or x¯i ≤ x−i and v is suﬃciently concave for gains;
• or x¯i ≥ x+i and v is suﬃciently convex for losses;
with x−i < GL(1+δ)−F
∗
i
2 and x+i >
GL+GH−F ∗i
2 two reference points such that:
∂v
∂x(GL − x
+
i ) = ∂v∂x(GH − F ∗i − x
+
i ),
∂v
∂x(GL − x
−
i ) = ∂v∂x(δGL − F ∗i − x
−
i ).
(8)
Proposition 1 means that, for intermediate values of x¯i (we have indeed x−i <
GL < x+i ) the optimal level of tuition fees increases with the reference point: the
higher the social aspiration of an individual is, the higher her tuition fees should
be. For more extreme values of x¯i the relation still holds when v is suﬃciently con-
cave for gains and convex for losses. This means that, as soon as the students are
suﬃciently loss averse, the social planner should systematically decrease the level
of tuition fees for poorer students, even in the absence of borrowing constraints.
We can indeed show that the level of tuition fees Fi has always a positive eﬀect on
the self-selection threshold p¯i, and that, under the conditions speciﬁed above, p¯i
decreases with the reference point x¯i: the individuals from a disadvantaged back-
ground — presenting therefore a low social aspiration and a relatively low reference
point x¯i — will have a higher threshold than an individual from a more favoured
background. This means that two individuals with the same quality and diﬀerent
reference points can take diﬀerent decisions, which is not optimal in terms of social
welfare. In particular, it means that the planner should correct this deformation
by the implementation of diﬀerent levels of tuition fees, according to the level of
the reference point of the individuals. We can highlight here an interesting mech-
anism, consistent with the ﬁndings of Breen and Goldthorpe (1997), Holm and
Jaeger (2008): individuals with a relatively high social aspiration are considering
both prospects as losses, and are therefore risk-seeking, unlike the students with
a more modest objective, who evaluate the outcomes of the prospects as gains,
and are therefore risk averse. We can therefore expect that those individuals will
behave more cautiously and take less risk than the students from a more favoured
background (this is typically what could happen with Marine and Tony: while she
wants to avoid at all costs losing a current social status, he is perfectly ﬁne with it
and will not express the same desire to improve his status). We have here an inter-
esting justiﬁcation of the introduction of decreasing tuition fees: individuals from
a disadvantaged background must pay less tuition fees, not because they are facing
funding issues, but because their modest social aspirations imply a too cautious
behaviour. In particular, even if universities manage to develop loan schemes such
that poorer students would not face borrowing issues, a policy of diﬀerentiated
tuition fees would still be needed.
4 Policy implications
Our aim is in this paper was to stress the necessity of introducing psychological
biases in the analysis of tuition fees as a selection mechanism, since it aﬀects
the eﬃciency of monetary incentives. We have suggested that a major bias in
educational choice was the subjective perception of educational outcome in terms
of social achievement or failure. We have shown that the implementation of a
unique level of tuition fees can be suboptimal in terms of social welfare: since the
individuals from a disadvantaged background have lower social aspirations, they
have a tendency to act too cautiously, and relatively good students will not be
suﬃciently encouraged to join university. The introduction of a simple cognitive
bias seriously questions the eﬃciency of a policy of tuition fees, since its mechanism
relies on the assumption that the willingness to pay of the students reveal their
true preferences (the function ui) and indirectly their quality. This willingness to
pay however depends on the perception of the outcome as gains or losses, which is
inﬂuenced by the social origins of the individual. The willingness to pay therefore
does not reveal the quality of the student, but a combination of her quality and
her social origins (the same willingness to pay can indeed either mean that the
individual is poor with a high quality, or rich with a low quality).
Our main result therefore suggests that an optimal policy would consist in the
implementation of decreasing tuition fees with the social origins of the students,
independently of any borrowing issues. Since individual reference points are de-
ﬁned as one’s social aspiration, and that social aspiration directly depends on one’s
social origins, we can use the income of the parents of the student as a proxy for
her reference point. We can for instance consider that an individual will perceive
her salary as a gain if and only if she gains more than her parents, since it will
allow her to sustain at least the standard of living of her parents. Concretely, such
kind of indexation of the level of tuition fees on the parents’ income already exist
in many universities, since it may also provide a proxy for the immediate ﬁnancing
capacity of the student: tuition fees in those situations however only take into
account issues of funding, and probably neglects the possible diﬀerence in social
aspirations. It is therefore possible that the level of tuition fees designed for poor
students, although lower than for rich students, is still too high.
Although we developed a very simple model of educational choice, we would
like to stress that our result would remain valid in more complex environments.
We suggest therefore now discussing the main hypotheses of our model: (i) the
absence of borrowing constraint, (ii) the probability of graduating is exogenous
and known by the student, (iii) there is a single public university. Firstly, in
presence of borrowing constraints, then the eﬀect of social origins will probably be
strengthened, since — in addition to the bias in perception — students from a poor
background are also less likely to be able to fund their studies. Secondly, modelling
the actual eﬀort of the individuals in the second stage (i.e. once they have joined
the university) could also lead to greater inequalities between social classes, since
students with higher ﬁnancial capacities can aﬀord private lessons in addition to
their standard courses. Lastly, if we consider private universities in competition
rather than a public one, then the fundamental issue remains identical: since
universities intend to select the best students, they must take into account the
possibility that individuals from a disadvantaged background are relatively more
sensitive to tuition fees than wealthier individuals. Whatever the structure of the
competition between the universities is, they still intend to select the students on
the basis of their quality, and must oﬀer lower tuition fees for poorer students so
as to compensate the cognitive bias of the individuals.
Such a policy of decreasing tuition fees may however present an undesirable
side eﬀect (highlighted by Epple et al. (2004)). The actual population of students
is quite heterogeneous across universities, i.e. the proportion of students from a
disadvantaged background is much higher in some universities than others. This
implies that the implementation of decreasing tuition fees will enable universities
with a high proportion of students from a favoured background to raise important
funds through the payment of tuition fees, whereas the universities for which the
proportion of disadvantaged students is high will not collect many funds. Such a
policy of decreasing tuition fees, even if it appears to be optimal on an individ-
ual level, can be questioned in the presence of heterogeneous universities at the
aggregate level, since it will generate serious inequalities between the universities
according to the population of their students. Empirical evidence of this phe-
nomenon have been documented by Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) in the context of
the Chilean education system. This suggests that the implementation of tuition
fees is likely to lead to segregation phenomena in higher education: in presence of
diﬀerentiated fees, we may observe a segregation between “rich” and “poor” uni-
versities, while a single level of fees is likely to lead to a segregation between rich
and poor individuals, since the disincentive will be too strong for poor individuals.
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Appendix
So as to study the impact of the reference point on the optimal level of tuition
fees, we will show the two following results:
∂p¯i
∂Fi
(x¯i;Fi) > 0, (9)
∂p¯i
∂x¯i
(x¯i;Fi) < 0. (10)
Indeed, the maximisation of the social welfare implies that two students with
the same abilities pi must take the same decision. If (10) holds, then a student with
a low reference point has a higher self-selection threshold, i.e. does not necessarily
choose the risky prospect when an individual with the same abilities but a higher
reference point does. In this situation, if (9) holds, the optimal level of tuition
fees should be lower when the individual has a low reference point, since this will
compensate the disincentive eﬀect of her social origin.
The relation (9) holds if and only if:
∂p¯i
∂Fi
=
∂v
∂x(GH − Fi − x¯i)(v(GL − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i))
(v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i))2
+
∂v
∂x(δGL − Fi − x¯i)(v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(GL − x¯i))
(v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i))2
> 0
(11)
which is true by construction, since ∂v∂x is positive ∀x, and GH − Fi − x¯i >
GL − x¯i > δGL − Fi − x¯i.
The relation (10) holds if and only if:
∂p¯i
∂xi
=
∂v
∂x(GH − Fi − x¯i)(v(GL − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i))
(v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i))2
+
∂v
∂x(δGL − Fi − x¯i)(v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(GL − x¯i))
(v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i))2
+
∂v
∂x(GL − x¯i)(v(δGL − Fi − x¯i)− v(GH − Fi − x¯i))
(v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i))2
< 0
(12)
which is equivalent to:
∂v
∂x(GL − x¯) ≥
∂v
∂x(GH − Fi − x¯i)
v(GL − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i)
v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i)
+∂v∂x(δGL − Fi − x¯i)
v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(GL − x¯i)
v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i)
(13)
This last condition means that the self-selection threshold diminishes with the
reference point if and only if ∂v∂x in x = GL− x¯i is higher than a convex combination
of ∂v∂x in x = δGL − Fi − x¯i and x = GH − Fi − x¯i. We now suggest identifying the
conditions under which:





∂v
∂x(GL − x¯i) >
∂v
∂x(δGL − Fi − x¯i),
∂v
∂x(GL − x¯i) >
∂v
∂x(GH − Fi − x¯i).
(14)
We can indeed notice that, when those two conditions are veriﬁed, (10) neces-
sarily holds. Knowing that v is concave for gains, convex for losses and steeper for
losses than for gains, we can deduce from the conditions (3):
∂v
∂x(y) ≥
∂v
∂x(x) ∀y ∈ [−x ; x], x ≥ 0 (15)
We have therefore:
x¯i ≥
GL + δGL − Fi
2 ⇒
∂v
∂x(GL − x¯i) ≥
∂v
∂x(δGL − Fi − x¯i)
x¯i ≤
GL +GH − Fi
2 ⇒
∂v
∂x(GL − x¯i) ≥
∂v
∂x(GH − Fi − x¯i)
(16)
These last conditions imply that, ∀x¯i ∈ [GL+δGL−Fi2 ;
GL+GH−Fi
2 ], the conditions
(14) are veriﬁed: p¯i is therefore decreasing for those x¯i.
We will now determine the interval of x¯ such that (14) is true. Consider
x¯ < GL+δGL−Fi2 : we have therefore x¯ < GL, the individual perceives the outcomes
GL and GH − Fi as “gains”. The concavity of v for gains implies:
∂v
∂x(GL) >
∂v
∂x(GH − Fi). (17)
Deﬁne now x−i as the level of the reference point such that:
∂v
∂x(GL − x
−
i ) =
∂v
∂x(δGL − Fi − x
−
i ). (18)
Due to the concavity of v for gain, we have:
∂v
∂x(GL − x¯i) >
∂v
∂x(δGL − Fi − x¯i) ∀GL > x¯i > x
−
i . (19)
This implies that, ∀x¯i ∈ [x−i ;GL], the conditions (14) are veriﬁed.
Consider now the case x¯i > GL+GH−Fi2 : we have now x¯i > GL, the individual
perceives the outcomes GL and δGL − Fi as “losses”. The convexity of v for losses
implies:
∂v
∂x(GL) >
∂v
∂x(δGL − Fi). (20)
Deﬁne now x+i as the level of the reference point such that:
∂v
∂x(GL − x
+
i ) =
∂v
∂x(GH − Fi − x
+
i ). (21)
Due to the convexity of v for losses, we have:
∂v
∂x(GL − x¯i) >
∂v
∂x(GH − Fi − x¯i) ∀GL < x¯i < x
+
i . (22)
The conditions (14) are therefore also veriﬁed ∀x¯i ∈ [GL ; x+i ]. We have there-
fore proven the ﬁrst part of proposition 1, i.e. the set of reference points such
that the optimal level of tuition fees necessarily increases with x¯i, if v veriﬁes the
conditions (3).
Consider now the case x¯i < x−i . We have ∂v∂x(GL− x¯i) < ∂v∂x(δGL−Fi− x¯i): the
condition (13) is therefore not necessarily veriﬁed for any function v that respects
the conditions (3) (for instance in the limit case in which v is linear and steeper
for losses). We can however verify that, when the concavity of v increases, the
weight v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(GL − x¯i)v(GH − Fi − x¯i)− v(δGL − Fi − x¯i)
in the relation (13) decreases: highly
risk averse individuals for gains will not perceive a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the outcomes GL and GH − Fi, and will therefore be more tempted to obtain a
sure gain GL. This means therefore that, if v is suﬃciently concave for gains when
x¯i < x−i , then (13) is veriﬁed.
With a similar argument for x¯i > x+i , we can argue that for a suﬃciently
convex function v for losses, (13) will be veriﬁed: highly risk-seeking individuals
will indeed try to avoid the sure “gain” GL (that they perceive as a loss), and tends
to perceive the outcomes GL and δGL − Fi as relatively close.
We have therefore:
• ∀x¯i ∈ [x−i ; x+i ], (10) always holds;
• ∀x¯i ≤ x−i , (10) holds if v is suﬃciently concave for gains;
• ∀x¯i ≥ x+i , (10) holds if v is suﬃciently convex for losses.
